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 Prior to the 2018 tax reform (the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act or TCJA), the tax code 
constrained firms’ ability to deduct incentive payouts that were not associated with pre-
established and objective measures. This constraint may have led some firms to design 
contracts that otherwise would have been sub-optimal in order to qualify for a tax 
deduction. However, the adjustments to restrictions on the deductibility of executive 
compensation under the TCJA eliminated the differential tax incentive to use clear 
objective targets over subjective ones. Consequently, firms are able to design more 
optimal contracts, independent of explicit tax consequences. In the Scholes-Wolfson 
framework, the elimination of the tax favored status of objective financial criteria allows 
the firm to increase the before-tax return by designing more efficient contracts (Scholes 
and Wolfson, 1992). This argument hinges on the assumption that firms care enough 
about taxes to write otherwise suboptimal contracts. However, I acknowledge that some 
firms may also optimize performance incentives without the consideration of tax 
ramifications. Accordingly, I use the TCJA as a setting to examine whether taxes 
influence the design of compensation incentives through the use of subjective criteria for 
top executives.  
Introduced in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93), Section 
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code generally capped tax-deductible compensation at 
$1 million, but allowed amounts beyond $1 million to be deducted if the compensation 
2 
qualified as performance-based.1 To qualify compensation as performance-based, 
performance measures had to be objective and verifiable. Consequently, firms largely 
relied on metrics tied directly to financial statement information and stock returns that 
were easier to verify; only infrequently did firms base performance goals on metrics that 
are harder to objectively quantify (Ittner et al., 2003; Cardinaels and van Veen-Dirks, 
2010; Armstrong et al., 2019; Guay et al., 2019).  
The primary objective of Section 162(m) was to change corporate behavior by 
reducing the level of executive pay (Perry and Zenner, 2001; Jensen and Murphy, 2018).2 
Yet, prior research documents rising payouts from incentive compensation in recent 
decades, citing the policy’s relative ineffectiveness in accomplishing its intended goal 
(Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Bereskin and 
Cicero, 2013). In April 2003, Senator Charles Grassley expressed his frustration with the 
law, noting that “[i]t has more holes than Swiss cheese.” In light of this criticism, 
lawmakers behind the TCJA significantly modified Section 162(m). The new 
requirements now designate all forms of compensation as non-deductible above $1 
million and, in doing so, remove the performance-based exception. Several concurrent 
studies investigate whether the new provisions of 162(m) influenced the level of 
compensation paid to executives and find mixed evidence in support of a change. In 
particular, De Simone et al. (2021) examine the impact of the TCJA on total 
compensation, the compensation mix, and pay-for-performance sensitivity but fail to 
                                                 
1 The $1 million threshold applied to “covered employees” of the firm which the IRS defined as the CEO 
and each of the firm’s next three most highly compensated executive officers for the taxable year, 
excluding the CFO. 
2 The House Ways and Means Committee explicitly stated the congressional intent behind the provision as 
follows: “[E]xcessive compensation will be reduced if the deduction for compensation paid to the top 
executives … is limited to $1 million per year.” For the full quote, see: 1993 U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News 877. 
3 
empirically document a statistically significant relation. In a related paper, Luna et al. 
(2020) find that salary increased while total compensation decreased among a subset of 
firms paying less than $1 million in salary prior to the TCJA. In a final study, Galle et al. 
(2021) find no evidence of significant changes to compensation payouts generally 
speaking, but do document a positive statistical relation among the more granular 
components of deferred compensation. 
An important component of the 162(m)-tax change is that by eliminating the 
performance-based exception, the associated criteria necessary to qualify for this 
exception are now also removed. Consequently, the amendments to 162(m) and loss of 
the tax deduction for performance-based pay now provide boards with the ability to 
provide discretionary awards without incurring a tax penalty from doing so. Moreover, 
boards are no longer required to use performance measures that are pre-established or 
objectively determinable. As a result, the tax incentive to use metrics that are easier to 
objectively establish is removed and firms are now freer to incorporate alternative 
measures of performance aimed at achieving non-traditional goals (Balsam et al., 2018). 
As an example, Stryker Corporation (2019) reported the following new performance goal 
for their CEO, Kevin Lobo, in 2018: “Qualitative assessment of his efforts in leading the 
Company's multi-year cost transformation initiative, driving commercial model 
innovation, strengthening the [c]ompany's leadership bench strength, and driving robust 
product performance processes and results.” Similarly, ViacomCBS Inc. (2019) included 
qualitative performance factors, such as reputation and diversity, as new elements of their 
bonus plan starting in 2018.3 In contrast to existing studies that investigate the effect of 
corporate taxes on executive compensation levels, I focus on the effect of taxes through 
                                                 
3 See Appendix A for further details on these examples and others included in this study. 
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the selection of performance measures and the associated use of discretion tied to 
executive bonuses.4 
 Ideally, a performance measure should reflect managers’ contribution to firm 
value independent of factors beyond their control (Ittner et al., 1997; Datar et al., 2001; 
Fan and Li, 2018). While the use of financial metrics is standard among compensation 
incentives, the additional use of nonfinancial metrics with discretionary criteria, has also 
been shown to be an important component of bonus contracts. Nonfinancial metrics with 
discretionary criteria often incorporate activities not fully captured by concurrent 
operating results or other financial statement activity (Feltham and Xie, 1994; Hemmer, 
1996; Gibbs et al., 2004; Rajan and Reichelstein, 2006; Neely and Al Najjar, 2006; 
Grabner, 2014). Consistent with this view, prior research finds value enhancing outcomes 
for firms that incorporate these elements into their bonus plans; they encourage managers 
to follow specific strategies from the underlying incentive tied to the metric, and thus 
provide complementary insight to financial measures (Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner et al., 
2003; Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; Ederhof, 2010; O'Connell and O'Sullivan, 2014; 
Chen et al., 2015; Maas, 2018). While the use of nonfinancial metrics in bonus contracts 
is not new, whether there is an increase in the use of subjectivity or discretion tied to 
these metrics as it relates to tax law is. I acknowledge that the use of subjectivity is also 
possible for financial metrics; nevertheless, I find compelling evidence that the use is far 
more common among nonfinancial metrics. Specifically, of the 1,320 subjective 
performance measures used amongst my sample, only 12 are connected to financial 
criteria. 
                                                 
4 Prior examples of such studies include, but are not limited to: Balsam and Ryan (1996), Halperin et al. 
(2001), Rose and Wolfram (2002), Reitenga et al. (2002), Harris and Livingstone (2002), and Frydman and 
Molloy (2011). 
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 To test whether the TCJA impacts the performance measures used in executive 
bonus plans, I first gather granular detail from Incentive Lab (IL) about the metrics used 
to incentivize CEOs from 2010–2019. Next, I manually collect information on the 
subjectivity of performance measures included in CEO bonus plans. I do so by reading 
the relevant information disclosed in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
(CD&A) portion of proxy statements for all my sample firms. To make the determination 
that a metric is subjective, I apply the following criteria: (1) the performance measure is 
not tied to a specific numerical outcome, (2) it is unclear as to how the goal is explicitly 
achieved, or (3) it is subject to an ex-post discretionary assessment or review by the 
board.5 Accordingly, by construction of my dataset, I can directly test whether the content 
of bonus plans (e.g., performance measures and criteria) and the use of discretion 
increases following the implementation of the TCJA. For all of my analyses, I use a 
difference-in-differences design to compare firms affected by the TCJA to a set of control 
firms whose compensation designs are unaffected by the U.S. tax reform.6 Specifically, I 
use all U.S. firms in my sample or a subset of those who do not indicate that their pre-
TCJA compensation plans qualified for a transition rule as the treatment groups. I then 
designate a matched set of European firms or the subset of U.S. firms in my sample that 
do indicate that their pre-TCJA compensation plans qualified for a transition rule as the 
control groups.7 
                                                 
5 Appendix A contains several examples of metrics included in bonus plans from firms’ actual proxy 
statements (Form DEF 14A) that meet such criteria. 
6 IL includes similar data from incentive plans on European firms. Accordingly, I hand-collect information 
on the use of subjective or discretionary metrics in the exact process for these firms. 
7 As explained further in Section 4.1, the TCJA includes a provision that designates compensation in 2018, 
and beyond, as grandfathered if a certain set of requirements are satisfied, thus permitting firms to continue 
to be subject to prior tax law. Therefore, I use a Python programming script and identify U.S. firms as 
grandfathered through their disclosure of such in the CD&A and use this alternative group of firms as an 
additional control group. 
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 In my first set of tests, I examine the changes in the use of nonfinancial and 
subjective metrics connected to the TCJA by identifying when both enter and exit a 
CEO’s bonus plan. My initial findings indicate an on average increase in the use of 
nonfinancial performance measures for treated firms and that this effect is stronger for 
measures connected to subjective criteria (i.e., there is a notable increase in the 
magnitude of the use of subjective performance measures as compared to nonfinancial 
measures). Specifically, treated firms increase the propensity and number of nonfinancial 
and subjective performance metrics relative to control firms. This move towards 
incorporating additional subjective metrics into bonus plans is also accompanied by an 
increase in the weight placed on these measures, which suggests that the importance of 
the discretion within incentives is also growing in priority. As a second approach to the 
use of subjectivity within bonus plans as it relates to the tax reform, I test whether there is 
also an increase in discretionary pay (i.e., cash bonuses unrelated to performance) and in 
the use of discretionary words within the CD&A. In both analyses, I find an increase in 
discretionary pay and language for treated firms. 
 To further isolate taxes as the principal mechanism behind my main findings, I 
conduct various cross-sectional tests as they relate to a firm’s tax status and sensitivity to 
the 162(m) provisional change. First, I find that firms whose fixed compensation (i.e., 
salary and other pay not connected to established performance metrics) in 2017 was 
above $1 million, and thus more sensitive to the $1 million deductibility limit, are more 
likely to include subjective metrics following the TCJA. Second, I use the level of net 
operating losses (NOLs) as firms with higher amounts are presumably less sensitive to 
the requirements of 162(m), and thus less sensitive to the potential loss of a tax deduction 
7 
from incompliance. I find that firms with NOLs less than or equal to the median amount 
in 2017 are significantly more likely to include subjective metrics into their bonus plans 
post-TCJA. Finally, following prior studies that document industries more likely to 
include nonfinancial performance measures in bonus plans, I test whether firms within 
these industries are less sensitive to the tax rule changes of the TCJA governing executive 
compensation. Across all variables on the use of subjectivity in bonus plans, I find that 
the inclusion of these metrics does not vary by industry affiliation. Specifically, I find 
that all firms appear more likely to include subjective metrics within their bonus 
arrangements following the relevant changes to 162(m) of the TCJA regardless of their 
industry affiliation. Overall, the results of these cross-sectional tests provide further 
validation that the findings I document are attributable to a tax effect.  
 I make several contributions to the literature regarding the effect of taxes on the 
design of executive bonus plans. My findings provide evidence of an increase in the use 
of subjective criteria following the passage of the TCJA. By exploiting a setting in which 
one potential barrier to the use of subjectivity within bonus plans is removed, the changes 
I document suggest that firms are increasingly moving towards compensating managers 
with a greater use of discretion. While I do not test initial consequences of this change, 
there are many potential shifts in firms’ operations that may be affected; whether these 
shifts provide a net long-run cost or benefit to investors is an open question.  
 I also contribute to the literature that analyzes the impact of external institutional 
factors or practices that influence executive pay (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016; Murphy, 
2013). In this line of research, three concurrent studies—De Simone et al. (2021), Luna et 
al. (2020), and Galle et al. (2021)—analyze the effect of the TCJA on executive 
8 
compensation levels and find mixed results. In an international setting, Bornemann et al. 
(2019) investigate a similar tax policy change in Austria and fails to find an effect of 
corporate taxes on executive compensation levels. In contrast to these studies, I focus on 




BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Section 162(m) 
 Prior to the TCJA, the tax treatment of executive compensation had remained 
relatively unaltered since taking effect in 1994 as part of OBRA 93. As part of this 
policy, Congress capped tax-deductible compensation at $1 million for covered 
employees.8 However, performance-based compensation was exempted from this 
restriction, allowing amounts beyond the $1 million limit to be deducted if they qualified 
as performance-based. The requirements for qualifying incentive plans as performance-
based were the following: (1) The performance goals were determined by a compensation 
committee comprised solely of two or more outside directors. (2) The compensation 
committee had to determine the metrics that would be used to measure performance, 
thereby limiting measures selected to be objective and verifiable. (3) The performance 
goals under which the remuneration was to be paid were disclosed to the shareholders 
and approved by a majority vote. (4) Shareholders approved the material terms of the 
bonus plan, and the compensation committee fixed performance targets before the 
ninetieth day of the fiscal year in which the plan would take effect such that the outcomes 
of the performance targets were still perceived as “substantially uncertain.” Any misstep 
disqualified the plan and its compensation awards regardless of whether performance 
                                                 
8 Covered employees under prior law included the CEO on the last day of the fiscal year and the top four 
highest paid executives (in effect from 1994–2006) or the top three highest paid executives, excluding the 
CFO (in effect from 2007–2017). Congress expended 162(m) in 2007 to exclude CFOs from the definition 
of covered employees. 
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goals were achieved.9 Furthermore, the Code of Federal Regulations § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) 
adds additional clarification to the procedural requirements stated above: 
 “A preestablished performance goal must state, in terms of an objective formula 
or  standard, the method for computing the amount of compensation payable to the 
employee  if the goal is attained. A formula or standard is objective if a third-party 
having  knowledge of the relevant performance results could calculate the amount to be 
paid to the employee. In addition, a formula or standard must specify the individual 
employees  or class of employees  to which it applies.” 
 Section 162(m) was primarily established in an attempt to reduce the level of 
executive pay in response to the perception that executive salaries were excessive and 
unrelated to firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Yet, as noted by many 
studies, payouts from incentive compensation have continued to rise over the recent 
decades. For example, Frydman and Saks (2010) find that the average compensation of 
CEOs increased from just under $1 million in 1970 to over $14 million in 2000 and that 
compensation was predominantly composed of performance-based awards. Moreover, 
Murphy (1999) reviews the trends in pay practices for CEOs from 1970 to 1996 and 
documents a considerable increase in the level of compensation around the enactment of 
OBRA 93. While not explicitly connecting the level of compensation to 162(m), he 
shows that the majority of executive compensation is concentrated in performance-based 
pay, with stock options comprising the largest component. Finally, anecdotal evidence of 
firms’ awareness of and desire to utilize 162(m) as part of their compensation designs is 
substantial. For example, Tech Data Corporation (2017) states in its 2017 proxy 
                                                 
9 However, the provision did allow some flexibility to adjust performance-based awards without subjecting 
them to 162(m) through design structures commonly referred to as “umbrella plans” (also known as a “plan 
within a plan”). 
11 
statement that “162(m)’s deduction limit included an exception for performance-based 
compensation. The Company’s compensation programs are generally designed to enable 
the Company to grant awards that qualify for this performance-based exception.” 
Similarly, the number of shareholder lawsuits over the design, administration, and 
disclosure of plans that are intended to permit a company to pay fully deductible 
compensation have increased over the years, highlighting the importance of 162(m) even 
to firm shareholders. 
 The TCJA was signed into law in December 2017, becoming the most 
comprehensive tax policy reform since the Tax Reform Act of 1986. One significant 
provision was the introduction of adjustments to the tax treatment of executive 
compensation. Following 2017, the TCJA designates all forms of compensation as non-
deductible above the $1 million threshold, effectively eliminating the performance-based 
exception and its associated requirements.10 The House Ways and Means Committee 
believed that by removing the performance-based exception, firms can begin to focus on 
the long-term success of the company and, as a result, that this would lead to a reduction 
in performance pay.11 Thus, the statutory changes have broad, immediate implications for 
compensation arrangements. Firms are now immediately relieved of any tax penalty in 
losing the deductibility of executive payouts for not satisfying the procedural steps 
formerly mandated for paying compensation above $1 million.  
 An additional important element of the new 162(m) is that it includes a transition 
period for which binding contracts written before November 2, 2017, can continue to 
                                                 
10 Among other things, the TCJA also greatly expanded the definition of covered employees to include the 
CFO and the top three highest paid executives. In addition, the provision now stipulates that once an 
employee is covered, they are always covered, even after leaving and death. 
11 This statement was made as part of its report in November 13, 2017. 
12 
qualify as tax deductible, unless materially modified or renewed. Such modifications 
include accelerated compensation, deferred compensation, increases to salary, and 
changes to performance goals or their award amounts. On August 21, 2018, the IRS 
issued guidance for clarification on how firms can qualify as exempt from the new 
162(m) (Notice 2018-68). Nevertheless, considerable uncertainty remains surrounding 
the proper implementation of grandfathered status as the IRS continues to propose 
regulations regarding this transition rule.12  
 While the changes to 162(m) and the requirements regarding the use of 
performance metrics for a tax deduction are the main focus of this study, there are other 
additional modifications to the tax law that were introduced with the TCJA. Some of the 
more significant changes for corporations include (but are not limited to): (1) a reduced 
statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%; (2) one-time transition tax on all 
previously untaxed foreign earnings; (3) new provisions intended to curb U.S tax base 
erosion (e.g., Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax and Global Intangible Low-Taxed 
Income); (4) Limiting deductible interest; and (5) modifying carryback and carryforward 
rules for NOLs. Although none of the coinciding tax changes stemming from the TCJA 
appear relevant to significantly alter firms’ approaches to designing executive bonus 
plans, I recognize that it is difficult to entirely rule out many of these confounding forces 
and therefore caution the findings of this study with this caveat in mind.  
The Choice of Performance Measures and Use of Discretion in Executive Bonus 
Plans 
 The accounting literature generally focuses on the use of objective financial 
performance measures. For instance, qualitative measures or subjective evaluations 
                                                 
12 See Reg-122180-18 for more information.  
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introduce complicated issues regarding their contractibility and verifiability (Hemmer, 
1996). Similarly, data on nonfinancial performance measures and subjective performance 
evaluations are scant and usually troublesome to gather as they are often not machine 
readable. Nevertheless, in practice, nonfinancial performance measures and subjective 
evaluations are important in the delivery of incentives. Feltham and Xie (1994) model the 
decision to incorporate additional performance measures into contracts and find that 
financial measures are often incomplete, which can warrant the inclusion of additional 
measures to achieve a greater understanding of managers’ actions.  
 To date, the existing literature on nonfinancial performance measures has 
generally concluded that these measures produce positive externalities and long-term 
value to the firms that incorporate them into bonus plans. For example, many studies 
examine whether nonfinancial measures serve as leading indicators of performance and 
generally find evidence consistent with this idea (Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner and Larcker, 
1998; Ittner et al., 2003; O’Connell and O’Sullivan, 2014; Flammer et al., 2019). Other 
studies examine the implications stemming from the use of subjectivity and discretion for 
performance incentives. For example, Rajan and Reichelstein (2006) show that when a 
principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives, discretionary bonus 
pools, despite their additional agency cost, are optimal mechanisms. In a related study, 
Gibbs et al. (2004) find that subjective bonuses are used to complement perceived 
weaknesses in bonus awards that are based solely on quantitative performance measures. 
Ederhof (2010) also examines the use of discretion in bonus plans and finds that its use is 
related to non-contractible performance measures connected to future firm performance 
and not to the manipulability of the measure or power of the executive. Conversely, 
14 
Moers (2005) examines the impact of performance measure diversity and the use of 
subjective performance measures on performance evaluation and finds that both are 




 Prior to the TCJA, to qualify compensation as performance-based, firms had to 
meet several procedural requirements. Many of those requirements included restricting 
metrics, by which managers were incentivized, to be objective and verifiable. This likely 
limited the ability of corporations to incorporate subjective or discretionary metrics 
without incurring a tax penalty. Firms on occasion arranged plans that did not qualify for 
a tax deduction, but usually made some attempt to qualify a portion under 162(m).13 
Murphy and Oyer (2003) examine the effect of the introduction of 162(m) on annual 
bonus plans using survey data from 1993 to 1995. They find that nearly half of the 
respondents (84 out of a possible 190) report making tax-related changes to comply with 
162(m). Following the TCJA, corporations now have more freedom to move away from 
quantitatively driven metrics and incorporate performance measures that are more 
subjective into incentive compensation arrangements. The TCJA simplifies the formation 
of annual bonus plans, allowing a greater focus on subjectivity with performance 
measures. 
 Nevertheless, despite the changes to 162(m), many pundits continue to believe the 
TCJA will have little to no effect on the executive pay setting process. For example, 
David Kokell, head of U.S. Compensation Research at ISS states in an interview that ISS 
will continue to recommend voting against awards that are not reasonably linked to 
                                                 
13 Although 162(m) does not specifically preclude the use of subjective performance measures, the need to 
objectively verify metrics seemingly discouraged its use. Anecdotal evidence from proxy statement 
disclosures support this conjecture as firms frequently disclosed their attempts to qualify compensation 
payouts under 162(m). 
16 
“rigorous and transparent performance goals.”14 He expects compensation arrangements 
to continue to emphasize performance-based incentives and that “[i]nvestors …tend to 
prefer an objective payout formula with performance goals.” Furthermore, firms are still 
required to provide detailed disclosures on executive compensation within proxy 
statements and to provide shareholders with say-on-pay votes as mandated under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. These restrictions 
may discourage firms from altering the structure of incentive compensation. Therefore, 
whether the TCJA provides firms an immediate opportunity to adjust bonus plans and 
shift to a greater subjective focus remains an empirical question. 
H1: Firms immediately affected by the TCJA will increase the importance of 
subjective performance measures within executives’ bonus plans relative to 
control firms. 
                                                 




DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 I first collect data on executive bonus contracts between 2010 and 2019 from 
Incentive Lab (IL).15 IL provides granular detail from proxy statements (Form DEF 14A) 
regarding the structure of compensation contracts on the largest 750 firms by stock 
market value each year. Each firm is then retained in the database following its inclusion 
regardless of whether it persists within the top 750. IL collects specific information 
regarding the performance measures used and their related weights, targets, and vesting 
periods. Thus, the data allow me to construct variables related to different aspects of the 
bonus plan. I also include data from Compustat and Execucomp to supplement variable 
construction where necessary.  
 I begin my sample selection process by first limiting my analysis to CEOs. I also 
restrict the sample to calendar year-end firms. I make this decision because the 
consequences of the TCJA to non-calendar-year-end firms is not immediate upon its 
enactment and, as a result, the statutory changes introduced have a lagged 
implementation date for these firms.16 To the contrary, the TCJA went into effect on 
January 1, 2018, for calendar-year-end firms, just nine days after being signed into law.  
 As I am interested in the composition of bonus plans, I restrict my analysis to 
performance metrics that receive cash-based awards and that vest within the year. 
Therefore, if the data do not provide this information for the CEO, the observation is 
                                                 
15 I begin my sample in 2010 to mitigate the immediate impact and changes from the great recession on 
executive compensation (Anderson et al., 2010). 
16 For example, firms with fiscal year-ends in March of 2018 will not be subject to the new tax law until 
their fiscal year of April 2018 to March 2019. In addition to the effective date-time lag, fiscal year-end 
firms had slight modifications added to the TCJA (e.g., a blended tax rate), introducing unique planning 
opportunities and strategies available to these firms. 
18 
dropped from my analysis. Next, I exclude CEOs if their total compensation in 2017 is 
less than $1 million. I make this empirical choice as the previous performance-based 
exception to 162(m) applied only to compensation payments over this threshold. Thus, if 
a firm paid its CEO less than $1 million, the changes introduced by the TCJA are likely 
to have little to no effect regarding the compensation design and its payout, as the 
162(m)-limitation failed to apply to the firm. 
 The data also reveal various errors for identifying unique performance measures, 
primarily among nonfinancial metrics (see Armstrong et al., 2019; Guay et al., 2019). For 
example, spelling errors occur early in the sample years along with punctuation 
differences that would otherwise be categorized as unique measures in the bonus plan 
although the metric has not changed. In addition, the descriptions of performance 
measures may change slightly over the years while still referring to what appears to be 
the same goal. Examples of this are firms changing the description of customer 
satisfaction measures to guest satisfaction and vice versa. To mitigate any false 
identifications of unique measures, I first tokenize the descriptions of metrics to reduced 
versions of the words where possible (e.g., “discretionary” reduces to “discretion” and 
“strategic” to “strategy”). Next, as the average length of descriptions is just over three 
words (3.47 mean), I reduce all descriptions of performance measures to its first three 
words. Finally, I manually audit firm-year observations where a new metric is introduced 
into the bonus plan and make corrections where necessary. Nevertheless, despite my 
efforts to correct any errors within the data, they may continue to appear, introducing 
noise into my subsequent analyses. However, it is difficult to envision why this noise 
would manifest differently for treatment and control firms. 
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 As a final step to the data collection, I manually hand-collect information on the 
subjectivity or discretionary nature of the individual performance measures included in 
the CEO’s bonus plan over the entire sample period. To do so, I read through the CD&A 
portion of firms’ proxy statements and use my own judgement in making the 
determination as to whether the metric indeed meets this condition. Accordingly, I apply 
the following logic when making this determination: (1) the performance measure is not 
tied to a specific numerical outcome, (2) it is unclear as to how the goal is explicitly 
achieved, or (3) it is subject to an ex-post discretionary assessment or review by the 
board. The following three examples are excerpts I’ve collected from firm-specific proxy 
statements from my sample: (1) “[I]ndividual discretionary goals tied to: branch 
productivity; safety performance; recruitment of diverse employees; customer service at 
our branch operations; and online digital strategy” (United Rentals, Inc., 2019); (2) “The 
qualitative portion of the annual cash bonus was determined…including creating a 
culture of integrity, the continuing management of Comcast Cable and NBCUniversal, 
and our continuing focus on critical diversity and inclusion and customer experience 
metrics” (Comcast Corporation, 2019); and (3) “Individual performance goals were 
established for each NEO based on… an assessment of each executive’s [individual] 
performance relative to his objectives” (Avis Budget Group, Inc., 2019). I include the 
specific examples used above from actual proxy statements in Appendix A. 
 Table 1 summarizes my sample selection procedure. I additionally remove any 
observations that have missing variables. This elimination results in 1,118 unique CEOs 
in the sample for which I am able to identify the individual components of their bonus 
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plans. The number of CEOs identified then translates to a total of 4,911 firm-year 
observations. 
Research Design 
 I use a differences-in-differences design to test the effect of the TCJA on the 
inclusion of subjective performance measures in executive bonus plans. Central to this 
design choice is the inclusion of a treatment and control group to isolate the effect of the 
TCJA and the changes to 162(m) across a population of firms. To do so, I use a variety of 
approaches in identifying adequate treatment and control groups, each entailing certain 
tradeoffs in their selection, in an attempt to greater triangulate my results. For the first 
control group, I use IL and identify all European firms with available data over the 
sample period as tax planning considerations for executive bonus plans for firms located 
in Europe should be largely unaffected by tax reform in the U.S. For the second control 
group, I incorporate the transition rule from the TCJA that allows firms to continue to 
deduct compensation agreements under prior tax law if written and the payment was 
legally binding before November 2, 2017. This date represents the day the bill was first 
introduced in the House of Representatives and the first-time adjustments to 162(m) were 
publicly proposed, essentially eliminating the ability of firms to preemptively self-select 
into qualifying for grandfather status. Thus, grandfather firms appear to constitute a valid 
control group as they were exogenously awarded grandfather status that they can then 
only lose if qualifying contracts are subsequently modified or renewed. To identify 
grandfathered firms, I construct a Python programming script to scrape all proxy 
statement disclosures (Form DEF 14A) filed with the SEC in 2018 and pinpoint instances 
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in which firms reference words related to the TCJA or 162(m) that also occur within 
references related to the transition rule or grandfather provision.17 
 Following the identification of the above control groups, I then construct my 
empirical analyses into the following treatment and control groups and elaborate on the 
associated tradeoffs. First, I select U.S. and European firms as the treatment and control 
groups, respectively. The advantages of this selection are that the treatment group is 
immediately subject to the U.S. tax reform (548 U.S. firms) and the control group is 
largely insulated from its effect (104 European Firms). However, the drawbacks are that 
(1) the treatment group also includes firms that qualify for grandfathered status, thereby 
introducing noise into identifying the true treatment effect, and (2) the analysis is limited 
to a subset of control variables of executive characteristics used in prior literature due to 
data constraints (see section 4.3 for specific variables). Second, I select non-grandfather 
U.S. firms (418 firms) as the treatment group and European firms as the control group. 
For this selection, the advantage is that I remove grandfather firms from the sample and 
the associated noise from their inclusion. The drawback is that, again, the analysis is 
limited to a subset of control variables of executive characteristics. Finally, I define non-
grandfather firms as treated and grandfather firms (130 firms) as controls, thereby 
limiting my sample to only U.S. firms. The advantages of this approach are that (1) the 
associated noise from grandfather firms being included in the treatment group is removed 
and (2) all relevant control variables identified in prior literature are available for 
selection. However, the main drawback from this approach is that there are potential 
selection issues within the control sample of grandfather firms. For example, for 
                                                 
17 I provide greater detail of this process and examples of the disclosures selected indicating grandfathered 
status in the Online Appendix. 
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grandfathered plans that indicate they were likely to qualify for the transition rule, the 
firm would need to have a shareholder-approved plan in place with the performance 
criteria to be used for performance-based compensation. Thus, the comparison would be 
between firms that have an existing multi-year compensation plan with performance 
criteria in place to those that do not. 
 To examine whether the TCJA affected executive bonus plans, I create several 
dependent variables that capture the various types of performance metrics and their 
usage, all of which are disclosed within the proxy statement, and I estimate the following 
entropy-balance-weighted regression model (McMullin and Schonberger, 2020): 
 
 
                                                                             
(1) 
where PLAN COMPONENT entails dependent variable measurements pertaining to 
executives’ bonus plans detailed below. The variable TCJA is an indicator variable equal 
to one for the years greater than or equal to 2018, the enactment date of the TCJA, and 
zero otherwise. I measure TREATMENT as an indicator variable equal to one for all U.S. 
firms, and zero otherwise. My main variable of interest is the interaction between TCJA 
and TREATMENT. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the new 162(m) will allow firms to place 




 I begin the construction of my dependent variables by identifying all performance 
metrics as either nonfinancial and subjective. For the first set of dependent variables, I 
follow prior studies and take the natural logarithm of the total number of nonfinancial and 
subjective metrics used within the executive’s bonus plan (the logs of NONFIN 
MEASURES and SUB MEASURES plus one, respectively).   
 For the second set of dependent variables, I construct indicator variables equal to 
one for the first year that a unique nonfinancial metric is added to the manager’s bonus 
plan (ADDED NONFIN), and zero otherwise. I then use the subjective metrics and 
identify when these unique metrics enter the manager’s bonus plan (ADDED SUB), and 
zero otherwise.  
 As the final set of dependent variables, I construct two alternative variables that 
continue to capture the construct of discretion used within the bonus plan. For the first 
measure, I use the level of discretionary bonuses (i.e., bonuses paid unrelated to 
performance) paid to CEOs during the year (BONUS). For the second variable, I scrape 
the CD&A portion of all proxy statements for instances of the use of discretionary 
language. Accordingly, I count all instances of when the words “discretion,” 
“discretionary,” “qualitative,” “subjective,” and “subjectivity” are used (DISC WORDS) 
each year across my sample period. I complete the construction of both variables by 
taking the log of each respective variable plus one. 
Controls 
 I first include standard economic determinants of incentives (INCENTIVE 
CONTROLS) to control for firm-specific attributes connected to influencing the structure 
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of performance metrics and compensation arrangements in general (Core et al., 2008). 
These variables include firm size (SIZE), investment opportunities (MTB), free cash flow 
(FCF), and performance (RET and ROA).  Agency theory also suggests that the noise in a 
performance measure and its weight are negatively related (Banker and Datar, 1989). I 
therefore include measures of the noise in returns (IDIO VOL) and the noise in earnings 
( ), as the standard deviation of idiosyncratic stock-price returns and ROA over 
the previous 60 months and previous five years, respectively.  
 Second, I include controls related to nonfinancial metrics as the use of 
subjectivity within bonus plans is most connected to these metrics. Following Ittner et al. 
(1997) and Said et al. (2003), I control for long-term incentives to address the possibility 
that they complement or substitute for nonfinancial performance measures in motivating 
executives. To do this, I divide each executive’s equity holdings (stock and exercisable 
options) by salary and bonus pay (LONG TERM). 
 Next, following Chen et al. (2015), I include controls for competition. Prior 
studies document that firms with aggressive strategies are more prone to include 
nonfinancial performance measures (Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Ittner et al., 1997). 
As such, I follow Ittner et al. (1997), Said et al. (2003), and Chen et al. (2015) and 
measure a firm’s competitive strategy (STRATEGY) by factor analysis, using three firm-
level proxies: (1) R&D to sales ratio, (2) market-to-book ratio, and (3) the ratio of 
employees to sales. The factor analysis results in one factor on which all three proxies 
load significantly positive. Prior to the factor analysis, I set all missing values of R&D to 
zero. I also include measures for competition type and intensity as Chen et al. (2015) find 
that the use of nonfinancial metrics varies in the presence of competition intensity 
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conditional on competition type, such as price versus non-price competition. Consistent 
with prior literature, I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on Fama and 
French (1997) 48 industry categories to measure competition intensity (HHI SALE). HHI 
is calculated by summing the squared market share of each firm in an industry into 
percentages. Next, I follow the economics literature and measure competition type as the 
ratio of advertising to sales (ADVERT) (Stigler, 1968; Symeonidis, 2000).18  
 The final set of control variables are directed at controlling for the 
contemporaneous influence of executive characteristics (EXECUTIVE CONTROLS), 
particularly that of the CEO, during the contract setting process. Prior literature has 
shown that the degree of CEO power can influence the compensation setting process 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Mobbs, 
2013; Abernethy et al., 2015). As such, I control for this effect using an indicator equal to 
one if the manager also serves as the chairperson of the board (CEO CHMN). Variables 
used in prior studies that capture the construct of executive power also include the 
executive’s ownership (OWNERSHIP), tenure (TENURE), and age (AGE). However, I 
only include these variables when using the non-grandfather and grandfather firms as the 
treatment and control groups, respectively, due to data constraints for the set of European 
control firms in the IL database.19  Finally, I include the presence of a consultant 
(CONSULTANT) to control for their influence during the contract setting process 
(Cadman, 2010; Murphy and Sandino, 2010, 2019).  
Entropy Balancing and Final Regression Specifications 
                                                 
18 For each of the control variables listed in this section (Section 4.3) and defined within INCENTIVE 
CONTROLS, I run the analyses on lagged values at year-end and continue to find consistent results (results 
un-tabulated). 
19 I use Execucomp to construct these variables. As a result, I am unable to include similar measures for 
European firms as Execucomp does not provide data on these firms. 
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 As the treatment (i.e., U.S. firms) and control (i.e., European firms) groups are 
from separate countries, this raises the concern that the results may be driven by 
fundamental differences between the two groups of firms. I mitigate this concern in 
several ways. First, as performance measures, are often highly firm-specific and difficult 
to compare across firms, I include firm fixed effects ( ) to effectively remove time-
invariant differences (e.g., organizational structure, industry affiliation, country specific 
regulation) across our treatment and control samples. Second, because the parallel trends 
assumption is key to the identification of the difference-in-differences estimator (Roberts 
and Whited, 2013), I use entropy balancing to reweight European firm-years based on the 
control variables used in Equation (1) for the years prior to the TCJA to ensure covariate 
balance across U.S. (treated) and European (control) samples.20 Note, my ultimate goal is 
to ensure that the parallel trends assumption holds in the data and ensuring covariate 
balance between treatment and control firms helps achieve this goal. Third, I run several 
cross-sectional tests that allow me to exploit predictable within-treatment variation in the 
effect of the tax reform on U.S. firms’ bonus plans. I also include year fixed effects ( ) 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity that varies across time to address whether a 
common trend in bonus plan design is occurring over the sample period. All firm-level 
continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles to reduce the 
impact of extreme observations. Finally, I cluster standard errors by firm to address that 
residuals from Equation (1) may be correlated across years for a given firm. 
                                                 
20 Note, I do not use entropy balancing when estimating Equation (1) on the sample of non-grandfather and 





 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analyses. I 
include statistics of the variables for treatment and control firms separately. Panel A 
documents the various variables created from a CEO’s annual incentive plan. Sample 
firms use an average of 1.66 nonfinancial performance measures with an average of 0.52 
dedicated to subjective metrics.21 Because all firms operating in the U.S. are affected by 
the tax reform, with the exception of those that qualify for the transition rule, the use of 
European firms as a control sample raises the concern that any results may be driven by 
fundamental differences in compensation setting policies between the two groups as 
explained above. I mitigate this concern by using entropy balancing to identify 
observationally similar firms in the pre-period, consistent with Rajan and Zingales’ 
(1998) recommendation to focus on predicted details of the theoretical mechanism.22 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the covariate balance statistics before and after entropy 
balancing. I balance on the first moment (means) of covariate distributions, using a 
default tolerance level of 0.015. The statistics show significant covariate imbalance prior 
to matching. In particular, U.S. firms are significantly different to European firms prior to 
the TCJA across nearly every control variable. Consistent with the entropy balance 
algorithm assigning proper weights to control observations in the pre-period, 
                                                 
21 In un-tabulated results, I find that bonus plans are comprised largely of financial measures (financial 
statement and market based) with over 71% of all metrics categorized as such. 
22 I use entropy balancing to achieve covariate balance following evidence that entropy balancing addresses 
bias when estimating treatment effects in the presence of non-linear relations between control variables and 
the outcome of interest (e.g., McMullin and Schonberger, 2020). Inferences from estimating only ordinary 
least squares (OLS) are similar (results un-tabulated but available upon request). 
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standardized differences in means are insignificant (near zero) after matching. Similarly, 
while I do not balance on the second (variance) and third (skewness) moments of 
covariate distributions, I find that the variance ratios are largely balanced after running 
the algorithm (with the exception of IDIO VOL, STRATEGY, and ADVERT).23 
                                                 
23 I include descriptive statistics on the sample of non-grandfather and grandfather firms as the treatment 
and control groups, respectively, in the Online Appendix. 
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Analysis of the Effect of the TCJA on CEO Bonus Plans 
 I begin my multivariate analyses of H1 by first assessing the effect of the TCJA 
on the use of nonfinancial and subjective metrics in CEO bonus plans. Table 3 presents 
the results of estimating Equation (1). Panel A begins by using the natural log of the 
number of nonfinancial and subjective performance measures plus one (MEASURES 
NONFIN and MEASURES SUB, respectively). In Column 1, I use the full sample of 
treatment and control firms and find that the coefficient of interest, TCJA * 
TREATEMENT, is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05). This finding suggests that, 
for all treatment firms following the TCJA, the number of nonfinancial performance 
measures in the CEO’s bonus plan significantly increased relative to the entropy-
balanced sample of European firms. In Column 2, I re-estimate Equation (1) on the 
subsample of non-grandfather firms as the treated group and European firms as the 
control group and continue to document a statistically positive relation between the use of 
nonfinancial metrics and the TCJA. Finally, in Column 3, I designate the treatment and 
control groups as non-grandfathered and grandfathered, respectively. I then estimate 
Equation (1) using OLS and again find a positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term TCJA * TREATMENT, albeit the documented effect is attenuated within 
this specification. 
 Next, for Columns 4 through 6, I repeat the analyses of Columns 1 to 3 but use 
MEASURES SUB as the dependent variable. Across all three columns, I document 
positive and significant coefficients on the interaction term, TCJA * TREATMENT. For 
example, the result of Column 5 suggests that relative to the entropy-balanced sample of 
control firms, non-grandfathered treatment firms significantly increased the number of 
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subjective metrics present within bonus plans following the enactment of the TCJA. In 
economic terms, I find that the positive coefficient of 0.356 in Column 5 represents a 
42.7% increase in the use of subjective performance metrics among non-grandfathered 
treatment firms. 
 In Panel B of Table 3, I assess whether the TCJA affects the likelihood that firms 
will add unique nonfinancial or subjective performance measures to CEOs’ bonus plans. 
For this analysis, I use the dependent variables ADDED NONFIN and ADDED SUB, and 
estimate the entropy-balanced model of Equation (1). Columns 1 through 3 use ADDED 
NONFIN as the dependent variable. I find positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on TCJA * TREATMENT in Columns 2 and 3 but fail to document any 
significant relation in Column. Next, in Columns 4 through 6, I use ADDED SUB as the 
dependent variable and document a significantly positive relation across all columns and 
regression specifications. Specifically, the positive coefficient in Column 5 suggests that 
there is an increase in the likelihood of adding a metric with discretionary criteria to a 
non-grandfathered CEO’s bonus plan relative to the entropy-balanced European control 
firms. This finding is consistent with treatment firms, (i.e., non-grandfathered U.S. firms) 
immediately subject to the new tax law are significantly more likely to add new, unique 
subjective performance measures into the CEO’s bonus plan. In terms of economic 
magnitude for Column 5, the positive coefficient of 0.293 suggests that the percentage 
change in the probability that a treatment firm adds a subjective metric after the TCJA 
increased by 29.3%.  
 Overall, the information presented in Table 3 supports H1 in that I find evidence 
of firms incorporating additional discretionary criteria to performance measures 
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following the enactment of the TCJA and the associated changes to 162(m). Across 
various measurements of subjective metric use, I find consistent evidence that firms 
exposed to the new tax law are significantly more likely to adopt subjective measures of 
performance in CEO bonus plans. 
Analysis of the Importance of Subjective Metrics 
 In this subsection, I assess the impact of the TCJA on the perceived importance 
that firms place on subjective performance measures. The weights attached to 
performance measures indicate the percentage of compensation available to the executive 
for achieving the specific goal. Ittner et al. (2003) explain that the relative weights placed 
on performance measures, other than financial results, are a function of their 
informativeness. Therefore, the weight attached to the performance measures 
communicates the importance of the metric to the executive and the perceived 
informativeness of the metric to the firm. To accomplish this, I first require that all 
performance measure weights within a CEO’s bonus plan sum to 100%;24 I drop any 
observation that violates this restriction. This results in a sample reduction to 4,049 firm-
year observations with 956 unique CEOs. I then re-estimate Equation (1) using the 
weights firms place on subjective performance measures as the dependent variable 
(WEIGHT SUB).  
 Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. Consistent with subjective metrics 
retaining a more prominent role post-TCJA, I find a positive and significant effect on the 
                                                 
24 Instances of weights summing to more than 100% occur frequently within Incentive Lab. For example, if 
a company employs financial and nonfinancial metrics in a bonus plan but chooses to weight the 
nonfinancial metrics at 50%, the individual nonfinancial metrics within the group will then have 
percentages that sum to 100% but that only contribute to the 50% overall weight. Therefore, if a 
nonfinancial metric receives a weight of 75%, its overall weight when considering the bonus plan as a 
whole would be 37.5% ([0.50 * 0.75]). In addition, under prior law, firms often implemented an umbrella 
plan that could potentially add weights to greater than 100%.   
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interaction term, TCJA * TREATMENT, across all three columns and regression 
specifications. These results suggest that, on average, treatment firms increased the 
importance of subjective metrics to CEOs following the TCJA relative to control firms. 
In economic terms, the coefficient of 0.167 on the interaction term in Column 1 suggests 
that, in the year the TCJA came into effect, the weight on subjective metrics increased by 
0.167 percentage points for treatment firms (U.S. firms), holding all other variables 
constant. 
Alternative Components of Bonus Plans 
 In this final subsection, I assess whether the effects of the TCJA and the use of 
subjectivity extend to alternative components of CEO bonus plans. First, I examine 
whether the level of discretionary pay, defined as the amount of bonus compensation 
unrelated to performance, is affected by the changes to 162(m). To do so, I take the log of 
the level of bonuses (BONUS) plus one from IL for each CEO of my sample. I also 
replace all missing values to zero. I then designate treatment and control firms using the 
grandfathered approach described above. I make this decision as my initial control group 
of European firms scarcely use discretionary bonuses (e.g., only 11 of all 735 firm-year 
observations of European firms have discretionary pay greater than zero). Second, I 
scrape the CD&A section all proxy statements filed over my sample period for instances 
of the use of discretionary language when describing executive pay. Accordingly, I 
quantify the number of instances in which a firm uses one of the following words: 
“discretion,” “discretionary,” “qualitative,” “subjective,” and “subjectivity.” I then 
construct DISC WORDS by taking the log of this number (DISC WORDS) plus one.  I 
again only use non-grandfathered and grandfathered firms as the treatment and control 
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groups, respectively, as disclosures on executive pay is not accessible through EDGAR 
for the control group of European firms. 
 Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. In Column 1, I use the log of BONUS 
plus one as the dependent variable. I find evidence of a positive effect of the TCJA on the 
level of bonuses paid to CEOs at treatment firms, relative to grandfathered firms. Next, In 
Column 2, I use the log of DISC WORDS plus one as the dependent variable and re-
estimate the effect of the TCJA on the use of discretionary language within the CD&A 
portion of proxy statements. I again document a positive and significant effect on the use 
of discretionary language within the CD&A following the enactment of the TCJA. 
Overall, the evidence from Table 5 continues to point to an increase in the use of 
discretion in bonus plans that are not only tied to performance measures. While I’m 
unable to estimate this relation using European firms as the control group, the evidence 
largely supports that of my main analyses. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES AND OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Sensitivity to $1 Million Deductibility Limit 
 To further validate that the previous results are indeed connected to the changes 
of 162(m), I assess whether firms more sensitive to the $1 million deductibility limit 
increase their use of subjective metrics relative to those that are less sensitive. To do this, 
I first define firms sensitive to the $1 million threshold as those whose fixed pay (e.g., 
salary) in 2017 exceed this threshold and partition my sample accordingly.25 The logic 
behind this definition is that if firms before the TCJA were paying their CEOs fixed 
compensation below the $1 million limit, the decision to include subjective metrics likely 
did not hinge on whether the metric would qualify for a tax deduction. Conversely, I 
suspect that firms paying their executives above this limit would be presumably much 
more likely to consider the tax costs of adding metrics that failed to qualify under 
162(m).  
 Table 6 presents this analysis. Using the log of SUB MEASURES plus one, 
ADDED SUB, and WEIGHT SUB as dependent variables, I find evidence that upon 
removal of the performance-based deduction of 162(m), firms paying fixed compensation 
above the $1 million limit (Columns 4 through 6) were significantly more likely to add 
subjective metrics to their CEOs’ bonus plans than were those below the limit (Columns 
1 through 3). I also test the equality of coefficients using a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) and find a statistically significant difference between the subsamples 
with the exception of Columns 3 and 6 (i.e., within the subsamples of non-grandfathered 
                                                 
25 In an untabulated analysis, I allow this definition of a firm’s sensitivity to 162(m) to vary by year rather 
than fixing on 2017. The findings of this subsection are robust to this alternate specification. 
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and grandfathered firms). I interpret these results as further validation of 162(m) 
influencing the use of discretionary measures of performance in executive bonus plans 
both before and after the TCJA. 
Presence of Net Operating Losses 
 Next, as an additional cross-sectional analysis of a firm’s sensitivity to the 
changes of 162(m), I include the presence of NOLs in the year prior to the enactment of 
the TCJA. Under previous tax law, the use of NOLs for tax purposes served two roles: 
firms could either (1) carryback incurred losses during the current year to offset taxable 
income in the two previous years or (2) carryforward the losses to offset future taxable 
income for 20 years. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, if a firm has accumulated NOL 
totals from previous years, this amount can be used to offset future taxable income and 
therefore mitigates the firm’s reliance on or need of the tax deduction of 162(m) to 
minimize their tax burden. Accordingly, I expect that the greater amount of NOLs a firm 
possess, the less likely the firm conformed to the previous 162(m) rules, and thus the less 
likely it is to respond to the corresponding changes of the TCJA. However, I 
acknowledge that tax rules regarding NOLs were also modified as part of the tax reform. 
First, all carryback rules were eliminated. Second, NOLs are now allowed to be 
carryforward indefinitely. Finally, NOLs are restricted to only offset 80% of taxable 
income. While it’s unclear how each of these individual changes also influence the design 
of CEO bonus plans, I recognize that the subsequent analysis is not free from these 
contemporaneous effects and, as a result, may introduce noise. 
 Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. I identify the level of NOLs in 2017 
from Compustat and partition my sample into firms with amounts less than or equal to 
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(Columns 1 through 3) and greater than (Columns 4 through 6) the median value for that 
year. Again, using the log of SUB MEASURES plus one, ADDED SUB, and WEIGHT 
SUB as dependent variables, I find evidence that firms were significantly more likely to 
add subjective metrics to CEO bonus plans when their pre-TCJA amounts of NOLs were 
below the median level than were those with amounts above. Using a SUR, I also find a 
statistically significant difference in coefficients for each of the models with the 
exception of Columns 3 and 6 (i.e., within the subsamples of non-grandfathered and 
grandfathered firms). These results suggest that firms possessing fewer NOLs were 
significantly more likely to comply to the previous version of 162(m), and thus more 
likely to add subjective performance measures post-TCJA.26 
Industries More Likely to Rely on Nonfinancial Performance Measures 
 As a final cross-sectional analysis, I follow prior literature and identify industry 
affiliations that have a greater reliance on the use of nonfinancial performance measures. 
Again, while it is possible that firms employing nonfinancial metrics also complied with 
162(m) through the use of objective and quantifiable outcomes, I find evidence that the 
use subjectivity is far more common among nonfinancial metrics as defined by IL. 
Specifically, I find a total of 1,320 subjective performance measures among my sample 
with only 12 connected to financial criteria.  
 I use the fast foods, telecommunications, utilities, airlines, and hospitality 
industries as industries more inclined to include nonfinancial performance metrics in 
                                                 
26 Using data provided by Graham and Mills (2008), I also assess whether marginal tax rates (MTR) 
moderate the effect of the change in 162(m) as NOLs are significant component of MTRs. However, one 
drawback of this analysis is that the data only cover U.S. firms. As a result, I’m limited to examining this 
effect among the non-grandfathered and grandfathered firms as the treatment and control groups, 
respectively. Nevertheless, I find evidence largely consistent with firms having higher MTRs as those more 
likely to incorporate subjectivity into bonus plans following the TCJA (results tabulated in the Online 
Appendix). 
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CEO bonus plans following prior literature (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner et al., 1997; 
Banker et al., 2000; Campbell, 2007; Riley et al., 2003). I then partition my sample into 
firms within these industries (Columns 1 through 3) and all other industries (Columns 4 
through 6) and re-estimate Equation (1) amongst these subsamples. I expect that the more 
likely a firm was to include a nonfinancial metric into the CEO’s bonus plan prior to the 
TCJA, the more likely it is to have also incorporated discretionary criteria regardless of 
the loss of a tax deduction. In other words, I predict that among industries with greater 
nonfinancial metric use, the TCJA will have less of an effect on the adoption of 
subjective performance measures. Table 8 presents the results of this analysis. Across all 
columns, I find a positive and significant effect in the likelihood of including subjective 
criteria in CEO bonus plans following the TCJA. I interpret these results as evidence that 
the change in 162(m) of the TCJA led to an increase in the adoption of subjective 
measures of performance regardless of industry affiliation. 
Other Robustness Tests 
 Next, I discuss the results of several robustness tests of my main analysis. First, I 
conduct a parallel trends analysis to bolster the assumption that, in the absence of 
treatment, the change in the response variables would have been the same for both 
treatment and control firms. Figure 1 depicts the estimated coefficients from this analysis 
of both treated and control firms separately and of the incremental effect for treatment 
firms. I then present the regression results in Table 9 and note a positive and significant 
effect in only the post period. Second, I attempt to corroborate that the previous findings 
are not by random chance, and generate a placebo effect through two approaches: the 
randomization of the assignment of treatment and of treatment year. Across both 
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robustness tests, I fail to document a significant association for the placebo treatment 
groups and the placebo treatment period. Finally, I assess whether the adoption of 
subjective measures of performance is related to the bargaining power of the CEO. To do 
so, I use whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board as a proxy of bargaining 
power. While I continue to find a positive effect across all subsamples for treatment 
firms, I also find evidence that this relation is stronger in the presence of greater CEO 
power when testing the equality of coefficients through SURs.27 
                                                 




In this study, I examine a possible unintended consequence to the TCJA’s reform 
of 162(m) on the structure of executive bonus plans. By removing the requirements for 
qualifying performance-based compensation for a tax deduction, the TCJA eliminates 
one potential barrier to the use of subjective or discretionary criteria in bonus contracts. I 
examine whether firms respond to this tax law change by increasing the number of and 
weights on subjective performance goals when incentivizing management.  
I test this relation through a difference-in-difference research design using various 
approaches in the selection of treatment and control groups. I find evidence of an increase 
in the use and importance of subjective performance measures for treatment firms 
following the enactment of the TCJA relative to control firms. Specifically, I find that 
firms have increased the number of, their propensity to use, and the prominence of 
subjective performance criteria within bonus plans in the post-TCJA period.  
These results contribute to the literature regarding the effect of taxes on the use of 
subjective performance measures in incentive contracts and also to the nascent literature 
regarding the consequences of the TCJA. My findings indicate that, absent tax 
constraints, firms increase their use of subjective and discretionary criteria. Based on 
these findings, I would expect that over the long run, the use of discretion when 
evaluating executive performance is likely to be associated with various consequences at 
the firm and investor level; however, such analyses are beyond the scope of this paper.
APPENDIX A
2018 ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLAN EXAMPLES 
Panel A: 
Panel B: CBS Corporation 
Panel C: United Rentals, Inc. 
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Panel D: Comcast Corporation 




Variable Description Sources 
NONFIN MEASURES The total number of nonfinancial performance 
metrics used in the annual bonus plan. 
Incentive Lab 
SUB MEASURES The total number of subjective performance 
metrics used in the annual bonus plan. 
Incentive Lab 
ADDED NONFIN An indicator variable equal to one if a new unique 
nonfinancial performance metric is added to the 
CEO’s bonus plan. 
Incentive Lab 
ADDED SUB An indicator variable equal to one if a new unique 
subjective performance metric is added to the 
CEO’s bonus plan. 
Incentive Lab 
WEIGHT SUB The total amount of weight placed on subjective 
performance metrics. 
Incentive Lab 
BONUS The level of bonus compensation paid to a CEO Incentive Lab 
DISC WORDS The total number of words related to discretion 
within the CD&A portion of a firm’s proxy 
statement.  
Form DEF 14A 
TREATMENT An indicator equal to one for all U.S. Firms. 
Treatment equal to zero captures European firms. 
Incentive Lab 
TCJA An indicator variable equal to one for firm-years 
greater than or equal to 2018. 
Compustat 
SIZE Log of total assets. Compustat 
MTB The market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt scaled by total assets. 
Compustat 
FCF Operating cash flow minus common and 
preferred dividends divided by average total 
assets. 
Compustat 
IDIO VOL Standard deviation of idiosyncratic stock-price 
returns over the previous 60 months. 
CRSP 
Standard deviation of ROA over the previous 5 
years. 
Compustat 
RET Annual stock return. CRSP 
ROA Return on assets. Compustat 
LONG TERM The market value of the executive’s equity 




by the executive’s salary and bonus. 
STRATEGY A composite score of a firm’s strategy using 
factor analysis of the variables R&D to sales, 
MTB, and employees to sales.  
Compustat 
HHI SALE The Herfindahl-Hisrchman Index which 
calculates the sum of the squared percentage of a 
firm’s market share of sales in an industry based 
on the Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry 
categories. 
Compustat 
ADVERT The ratio of a firm’s advertising expense to total 
sales 
Compustat 
CEO CHMN An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also 
serves as chairman. 
Incentive Lab 
CONSULTANT An indicator variable equal to one if the firm uses 
a consultant in year t and zero otherwise. 
Incentive Lab 
OWNERSHIP The CEO's percentage ownership in the firm 
scaled by common stock shares outstanding. 
Execucomp 
TENURE The total number of years the CEO has been 





Fig. 1. Parallel trends assumption. 
Fig. 1a. Parallel trends using Log (SUB MEASURES + 1) for treatment and control firms separately. 
Fig. 1b. Parallel trends of the incremental effect for treatment firms using Log (SUB MEASURES + 1). 
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Fig. 1c. Parallel trends using ADDED SUB for treatment and control firms separately. 
 
Fig. 1d. Parallel trends of the incremental effect for treatment firms using ADDED SUB. 
 
Note: This figure presents the estimated coefficients when estimating Equation (1) after including year 
indicators prior to the TCJA enactment interacted with treatment firms. Figures 1a and 1c plot the 
coefficients for each event-year estimated separately for treatment and control firms. Figures 1b and 1d plot 
the incremental effect for treatment firms estimated using the entire sample. The dots (lines) represent 




CEOs with cash-based incentive compensation from 2010-2019 2,420 
Less: Performance metric vests longer than a year (10) 
Non-calendar year-end firms (431) 
CEO's total compensation is less than $1 
million in 2017 (6) 
Missing control variables (855) 
Final number of unique CEOs 1,118 
Final sample of firm-year observations 4,911 
Table 1 presents the sample selection process. The final number of CEOs translates 4,911 
firm-year observations. We begin by identifying all CEOs covered in Incentive Lab over 
the sample period of 2010-2019. 
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Table 2       
Descriptive statistics and covariate balance statistics before and after entropy balancing             
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         TREATMENT = 1   TREATMENT = 0 
  N Mean Median S.D.  N Mean Median S.D.  N Mean Median S.D. 
NONFIN MEASURES  4,911 1.66 1.00 2.36  4,176 1.62 1.00 2.44  735 1.87 1.00 1.80 
SUB MEASURES  4,911 0.52 0.00 0.98  4,176 0.49 0.00 1.01  735 0.75 0.00 0.77 
ADDED NONFIN  4,911 0.27 0.00 0.45  4,176 0.24 0.00 0.42  735 0.48 0.00 0.50 
ADDED SUB  4,911 0.15 0.00 0.36  4,176 0.17 0.00 0.37  735 0.09 0.00 0.28 
WEIGHT SUB  4,049 0.08 0.00 0.49  4,176 0.07 0.00 0.48  735 0.12 0.16 0.55 
BONUS  4,176 0.12 0.00 0.84  3,110 0.12 0.00 0.90  1,066 0.10 0.00 0.64 
DISC WORDS  4,107 0.99 0.00 1.66  3,048 0.98 0.00 1.66  1,063 1.02 0.00 1.67 
 
Panel B: Covariate Balance Statistics Before and After Entropy Balancing         
Prior to balancing: Treatment Firms (4,176 Obs.) Control Firms (735 Obs.) Balance Stats 
Covariate Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Std Diff Variance Ratio 
SIZE 8.983 2.135 0.360 10.909 2.728 0.301 -1.318† 0.783† 
MTB 2.026 1.824 2.522 1.679 1.320 3.413 0.257† 1.382† 
FCF 0.083 0.004 0.683 0.058 0.003 0.706 0.377† 1.588† 
IDIO VOL 0.402 0.221 5.011 0.313 0.040 2.535 0.190† 5.557† 
 
0.040 0.002 2.288 0.026 0.001 3.393 0.300† 2.207† 
RET 0.122 0.113 0.654 0.034 0.090 0.544 0.265† 1.249† 
ROA  0.059 0.006 0.368 0.048 0.004 1.860 0.143† 1.548† 
LONG TERM 5.105 16.406 2.424 1.600 8.508 5.394 0.865† 1.928† 
STRATEGY 0.005 0.673 2.532 -0.199 0.361 2.607 0.248† 1.864† 
HHI SALE 0.019 0.000 2.439 0.020 0.000 2.252 -0.081 0.706† 
ADVERT 0.010 0.001 3.359 0.006 0.000 4.928 0.182† 1.356† 
CEO_CHMN 0.503 0.250 -0.011 0.193 0.156 1.554 0.619† 1.602† 




After balancing:    
Covariate Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Std Diff Variance Ratio 
SIZE 8.983 2.135 0.360 8.983 1.113 0.515 0.000 0.812 
MTB 2.026 1.824 2.522 2.026 1.597 1.447 0.000 1.142 
FCF 0.083 0.004 0.683 0.083 0.003 0.287 0.000 1.199 
IDIO VOL 0.402 0.221 5.011 0.402 0.060 1.508 0.000 3.686† 
 
0.040 0.002 2.288 0.040 0.003 1.590 0.000 0.846 
RET 0.122 0.113 0.654 0.122 0.109 0.301 0.000 1.037 
ROA  0.059 0.006 0.368 0.059 0.004 1.845 0.000 1.186 
LONG TERM 5.105 16.406 2.424 5.104 77.110 1.953 0.000 0.213† 
STRATEGY 0.005 0.673 2.532 0.005 0.287 0.832 0.000 2.346† 
HHI SALE 0.019 0.000 2.439 0.019 0.000 2.948 0.000 0.833 
ADVERT 0.010 0.001 3.359 0.010 0.001 3.217 0.000 0.470† 
CEO_CHMN 0.503 0.250 -0.011 0.503 0.250 -0.010 0.000 0.999 
CONSULTANT 0.947 0.051 -3.973 0.941 0.056 -3.744 0.025 0.911 
                  
† Indicates covariates with standardized differences (variance ratios) outside of the +/- 0.1 (4/5 and 5/4) bounds suggested by Rubin (2001) as 
indicating a balanced covariate. 
This table presents summary statistics and covariate distributions before and after entropy balancing (EB) for all U.S. firms (treated firms) and 
remaining cross-listed European firms (weighted control sample). Standardized differences are calculated as the difference in means between 
treated and control samples divided by the standard deviation of the treated sample for each covariate. The standardized difference will approach 
zero when the distribution for a particular covariate is more similar between treated and control samples. Variance ratios are calculated as the ratio 




Annual Bonus Plan Changes 
Panel A: Performance Measures 




MEASURES + 1) 
Log (NONFIN 
MEASURES + 1) 
Log (NONFIN 
MEASURES + 1) 
Log (SUB 
MEASURES + 1) 
Log (SUB 
MEASURES + 1) 
Log (SUB 
MEASURES + 1) 
TCJA * 
TREATMENT 0.265** 0.286* 0.067** 0.334*** 0.356*** 0.090** 
(0.096) (0.151) (0.027) (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) 
SIZE -0.143*** -0.177*** -0.066** -0.082 -0.117** -0.009
(0.021) (0.067) (0.021) (0.050) (0.056) (0.025)
MTB 0.017 -0.003 0.016 -0.029 -0.064 -0.020
(0.047) (0.043) (0.014) (0.040) (0.043) (0.019)
FCF 0.103 0.153 -0.287* 0.161 0.142 0.161
(0.230) (0.192) (0.154) (0.175) (0.188) (0.178)
IDIO VOL 0.004 -0.002 0.007 0.021 0.013 0.025
(0.020) (0.027) (0.010) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019)
0.363 0.436 0.198 -0.270 -0.234 -0.093
(0.262) (0.337) (0.208) (0.372) (0.378) (0.241)
RET -0.002 0.001 -0.026 0.049* 0.063* 0.010
(0.080) (0.021) (0.016) (0.029) (0.032) (0.016)
ROA 0.007 -0.017 0.022 0.330** 0.401*** 0.031
(0.248) (0.216) (0.191) (0.136) (0.146) (0.116)
LONG TERM -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
STRATEGY -0.066 -0.028 -0.063 -0.027 0.024 -0.015
(0.105) (0.101) (0.042) (0.075) (0.083) (0.037)
HHI SALE 3.461* 4.613* 2.752* -0.280 0.452 0.111
(1.750) (2.652) (1.492) (3.044) (3.650) (1.813)
ADVERT 2.478** 1.821 2.025* -0.016 -0.634 1.406*
(0.895) (1.587) (0.995) (1.067) (1.137) (0.754)
CEO CHMN -0.025 -0.021 -0.020 -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.021
(0.039) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.020)
CONSULTANT 0.022 0.010 -0.037* -0.003 -0.018 -0.037
(0.030) (0.046) (0.019) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040)
Constant 1.837*** 2.175*** 1.258*** 1.197*** 1.585*** 0.539**
(0.218) (0.543) (0.186) (0.395) (0.451) (0.247)
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Observations 4,911 3,845 4,176 4,911 3,845 4,176 
R-squared 0.727 0.728 0.769 0.642 0.649 0.677 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 

























Panel B: Added Measures 
















TREATMENT 0.179 0.252* 0.235*** 0.222*** 0.293*** 0.248*** 
(0.155) (0.152) (0.038) (0.054) (0.056) (0.037) 
SIZE -0.105* -0.131** -0.039 -0.009 -0.015 -0.023
(0.055) (0.063) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
MTB -0.053 -0.063 0.006 -0.050* -0.056 -0.023
(0.041) -0.052 (0.018) (0.028) (0.037) (0.015)
FCF 0.806 0.926 -0.436** -0.002 0.016 -0.110
(0.549) (0.580) (0.180) (0.105) (0.115) (0.154)
IDIO VOL 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.018
(0.033) (0.035) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.016)
0.920 0.976 -0.015 0.203 0.180 -0.058
(0.694) (0.735) (0.273) (0.176) (0.184) (0.237)
RET 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.025 0.032 0.024
(0.049) (0.056) (0.022) (0.031) (0.034) (0.019)
ROA -0.526 -0.645* -0.100 0.026 0.031 -0.087
(0.323) (0.370) (0.136) (0.149) (0.166) (0.123)
LONG TERM 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
STRATEGY 0.062 0.078 -0.027 0.082 0.086 0.014
(0.101) (0.129) (0.031) (0.068) (0.089) (0.027)
HHI SALE -2.717 -2.183 0.092 -3.569** -3.547** -0.762
(4.717) (4.962) (2.595) (1.461) (1.584) (2.082)
ADVERT 4.782*** 4.795*** 2.497*** 1.986*** 1.752** 2.407***
(1.565) (1.789) (0.743) (0.648) (0.681) (0.760)
CEO CHMN -0.039 -0.024 -0.035 -0.065** -0.059 -0.038**
(0.026) (0.031) (0.022) (0.032) (0.038) (0.019)
CONSULTANT 0.171** 0.175** 0.020 0.019 0.011 0.016
(0.068) (0.075) (0.041) (0.029) (0.036) (0.039)
Constant 1.223** 1.476** 0.539** 0.324 0.380 0.375
(0.526) (0.611) (0.250) (0.199) (0.244) (0.241)
Observations 4,911 3,845 4,176 4,911 3,845 4,176 
R-squared 0.727 0.728 0.769 0.642 0.649 0.677 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
































Table 3 presents the results of the difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of the TCJA on performance 
measures using an entropy-balanced-weighted regression model. Panel A uses the log of the number of 
nonfinancial (NONFIN MEASURES) and subjective metrics (SUB MEASURES) plus one as the dependent 
variables. Panel B assesses whether firms added new performance metrics to their annual incentive plans. 
ADDED NONFIN and ADDED SUB represent indicator variables equal to one for whether a firm has added any 
new nonfinancial or subjective metric, respectively, during the year. The variable TCJA is measured as an 
indicator equal to one for years greater than or equal to 2018 and zero otherwise. The variable TREATMENT is 
an indicator variable equal to one for all U.S. firms and zero otherwise. Columns 3 and 6 of each panel also 
include the control variables OWNERSHIP, AGE, and TENURE. In each analysis, I winsorize all continuous 
variables to the first and ninety-ninth percentiles and cluster standard errors by firm presented in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-value level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of the Importance of Subjective Metrics 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables: WEIGHT SUB WEIGHT SUB WEIGHT SUB 
TCJA * TREATMENT 0.167*** 0.172*** 0.017* 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.010) 
SIZE -0.035 -0.046* -0.018
(0.024) (0.027) (0.013)
MTB -0.005 -0.011 -0.012*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.007)
FCF 0.012 0.004 -0.019
(0.079) (0.088) (0.085)




RET 0.009 0.016 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
ROA 0.124* 0.133* 0.126**
(0.071) (0.080) (0.060)
LONG TERM -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
STRATEGY -0.031 -0.031 0.007
(0.041) (0.044) (0.012)
HHI SALE -0.235 0.105 -0.027
(0.815) (0.983) (0.719)
ADVERT -1.038 -1.374 0.527
(1.603) (1.889) (0.523)
CEO CHMN -0.020* -0.021 -0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
CONSULTANT -0.033* -0.044** -0.037
(0.018) (0.022) (0.025)
Constant 0.531*** 0.658*** 0.338***
(0.203) (0.234) (0.105)
Observations 4,049 3,160 3,564 
R-squared 0.816 0.824 0.675 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 







Control Group European Firms European Firms 
Grandfathered 
U.S. Firms 
Table 4 presents the results of the difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of the TCJA on the 
importance of subjective performance measures using an entropy-balanced-weighted regression 
model. I use the total amount of weight placed on subjective metrics (WEIGHT SUB) as the dependent 
variable. The variable TCJA is measured as an indicator equal to one for years greater than or equal to 
2018 and zero otherwise. The variable TREATMENT is an indicator variable equal to one for all U.S. 
firms and zero otherwise. Column 3 also includes the control variables OWNERSHIP, AGE, and 
TENURE. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. I winsorize all continuous variables to the first 
and ninety-ninth percentiles and cluster standard errors by firm presented in parentheses. The symbols 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-value level, respectively. 
50 
Table 5 
Analysis of the Use of Discretion 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables:   Log (BONUS + 1) Log (DISC WORDS + 1) 
    
TCJA * TREATMENT   0.021** 0.040* 
    (0.009) (0.024) 
SIZE  0.002 0.067*** 
  (0.019) (0.018) 
MTB  0.009 -0.009 
  (0.008) (0.015) 
FCF  -0.043 0.114 
  (0.087) (0.137) 
IDIO VOL  0.014 0.004 
  (0.013) (0.014) 
  -0.030 0.035 
  (0.164) (0.183) 
RET  0.009 -0.009 
  (0.010) (0.017) 
ROA  -0.086 -0.226** 
  (0.075) (0.105) 
LONG TERM  -0.000*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
STRATEGY  0.015 -0.007 
  (0.021) (0.030) 
HHI SALE  -0.590 2.782* 
  (0.563) (1.677) 
ADVERT  -0.232 0.056 
  (0.386) (0.645) 
CEO CHMN  0.005 -0.019 
 
 (0.010) (0.016) 
CONSULTANT  0.018 0.042 
  (0.021) (0.034) 
OWNERSHIP  0.025* -0.005 
  (0.013) (0.006) 
AGE  0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.003) 
TENURE  -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant  0.043 4.909*** 
  (0.171) (0.173) 
    
Observations  4,176 4,107 
R-squared  0.480 0.726 
Firm FE  Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes 







Control Group   Grandfathered U.S. Firms Grandfathered U.S. Firms 
Table 5 presents the results on the use of discretion following the TCJA on additional components of bonus 
plans. I use the logs of the level of bonus compensation (BONUS) and number of discretionary words used 
in the CD&A (DISC WORDS) plus one as the dependent variables. The variable TCJA is measured as an 
indicator equal to one for years greater than or equal to 2018 and zero otherwise. The variable 
TREATMENT is an indicator variable equal to one for all U.S. firms and zero otherwise. See Appendix B 
for variable definitions 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Firms' Sensitivity to $1 Million Deduction Limit 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (6) 










ADDED SUB WEIGHT SUB 
TCJA * 
TREATMENT 0.270 0.005 0.100*** 0.317*** 0.295*** 0.100** 
(0.157) (0.092) (0.034) (0.117) (0.044) (0.040) 
Observations 2,825 2,825 2,372 2,086 2,086 1,677 
R-squared 0.685 0.390 0.871 0.699 0.437 0.706 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 




European Firms European Firms 
European 
Firms 
European Firms European Firms 
χ2 Statistic 5.00 7.48 0.00 
(p-value) (0.025) (0.006) (0.997) 
Table 6 presents the results on the use of subjective performance measures around the $1 million threshold. I partition the sample 
based on the value of the CEO's base salary (non-performance related compensation) above and below the $1 million threshold in 
2017. I use the log of subjective metrics (SUB MEASURES) plus one, an indicator variable equal to one for whether a firm has added a 
new unique subjective metric (ADDED SUB), and the total amount of weight placed on subjective metrics (WEIGHT SUB) as the 
dependent variables. The variable TCJA is measured as an indicator equal to one for years greater than or equal to 2018 and zero 
otherwise. The variable TREATMENT is an indicator variable equal to one for all U.S. firms and zero otherwise. See Appendix B for 
all variable definitions. Control variables are omitted for brevity. In each analysis, I winsorize all continuous variables to the first and 
ninety-ninth percentiles and cluster standard errors by firm presented in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-value level, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Firms' Sensitivity to Net Operation Losses (NOLs) 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (6) 










ADDED SUB WEIGHT SUB 
TCJA * 
TREATMENT 0.293*** 0.324*** 0.112*** 0.173** 0.105 0.095 
(0.090) (0.049) (0.031) (0.073) (0.087) (0.058) 
Observations 3,510 3,510 2,947 1,401 1,401 1,102 
R-squared 0.656 0.355 0.856 0.628 0.409 0.621 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 









European Firms European Firms 
χ2 Statistic 3.60 3.52 0.26 
(p-value) (0.058) (0.061) (0.607) 
Table 7 presents the results on the use of subjective performance measures conditional on the level of NOLs at the firm. I partition 
the sample based on the median value of NOLs in 2017. I use the log of subjective metrics (SUB MEASURES) plus one, an indicator 
variable equal to one for whether a firm has added a new unique subjective metric (ADDED SUB), and the total amount of weight 
placed on subjective metrics (WEIGHT SUB) as the dependent variables. The variable TCJA is measured as an indicator equal to 
one for years greater than or equal to 2018 and zero otherwise. The variable TREATMENT is an indicator variable equal to one for 
all U.S. firms and zero otherwise. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. Control variables are omitted for brevity. In each 
analysis, I winsorize all continuous variables to the first and ninety-ninth percentiles and cluster standard errors by firm presented in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-value level, respectively. 
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Table 8        
Analysis of Industries More Likely to Rely on Nonfinancial Performance Measures 
  (1) (2) (3)   (5) (4) (6) 











ADDED SUB WEIGHT SUB 
         
TCJA * 
TREATMENT 0.272*** 0.231*** 0.070* 
  
0.285*** 0.149* 0.112*** 
  (0.092) (0.062) (0.041)   (0.073) (0.085) (0.031) 
                
Observations 674 674 599  4,237 4,237 3,450 
R-squared 0.680 0.485 0.709  0.637 0.350 0.832 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm   Firm Firm Firm 








European Firms European Firms 
χ2 Statistic 1.23 0.62 0.71     
(p-value) (0.268) (0.431) (0.400)     
Table 8 presents the results on the use of subjective performance measures conditional on the likelihood of employing nonfinancial 
metrics. Following prior literature, I partition the sample based on industry affiliation for firms in the fast foods, telecommunications, 
utilities, airlines, and hospitality industries (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner et al., 1997; Banker et al., 2000; Campbell, 2007; Riley et al., 
2003). I use the log of subjective metrics (SUB MEASURES) plus one, an indicator variable equal to one for whether a firm has added a 
new unique subjective metric (ADDED SUB), and the total amount of weight placed on subjective metrics (WEIGHT SUB) as the 
dependent variables. The variable TCJA is measured as an indicator equal to one for years greater than or equal to 2018 and zero 
otherwise. The variable TREATMENT is an indicator variable equal to one for all U.S. firms and zero otherwise. See Appendix B for all 
variable definitions. Control variables are omitted for brevity. In each analysis, I winsorize all continuous variables to the first and ninety-
ninth percentiles and cluster standard errors by firm presented in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 




Parallel Trends Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables: Log (SUB MEASURES + 1) ADDED SUB WEIGHT SUB 
* TREATMENT 0.026 0.078 -0.136
(0.045) (0.054) (0.089)
* TREATMENT 0.019 -0.068 -0.102
(0.048) (0.067) (0.092)
* TREATMENT 0.064 -0.058 -0.079
(0.043) (0.057) (0.100)
* TREATMENT 0.100** -0.011 -0.073
(0.043) (0.056) (0.094)
* TREATMENT 0.068 -0.093 -0.079
(0.043) (0.061) (0.095)
* TREATMENT 0.019 -0.109* -0.114
(0.046) (0.061) (0.099)
* TREATMENT -0.082 -0.168** -0.092
(0.052) (0.065) (0.100)
* TREATMENT 0.172*** 0.232*** 0.167***
(0.055) (0.035) (0.041)
* TREATMENT 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.191***
(0.052) (0.036) (0.042)
Observations 4,911 4,911 4,049 
R-squared 0.657 0.349 0.672 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
Treatment Group U.S. Firms U.S. Firms U.S. Firms 




This table reports the results of the analysis examining the effect of the TCJA and the years 
surrounding its enactment on the use and importance of subjective performance measures. Columns 
1 through 3 use the log of SUB MEASURES plus one, ADDED SUB, and WEIGHT SUB as 
dependent variables, respectively. I create separate indicators for the nine event years surrounding 
the TCJA ( , , , , , , , , and ) and 
include their interactions with TREATMENT. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. Control 
variables are omitted for brevity. In each analysis, I winsorize all continuous variables to the first 
and ninety-ninth percentiles and cluster standard errors by firm presented in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 p-value level, respectively. 
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